Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Chris Wangsgard; Jeffrey C. Collins; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for
Appellant;
Robert F. Orton; Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., No. 18084 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2707
IN THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U~AH 
------------------~-----------------------------------------
SHELL OIL COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BRINKEREOFF-SIGUAL DRILLING 
COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Case No. 18084 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSEN, PRESIDING 
----------------------------------------------------
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Chris Wangsgard 
Jeffrey c. Collins 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 rE 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 ~ l ED 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FEB 16 1982 
~------------- .... --·-. - -- ---- -- ________ __, 
Cb'.~, S".J~'")!"::' ~~'...!rt, Ufo:, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U~AH 
------------------------------------------------------------
SHELL OIL COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BRINKERHOFF-SIGUAL DRILLING 
COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Case No. 18084 
------------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSEN, PRESIDING 
Chris Wangsgard 
Jeffrey c. Collins 
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Respondent 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT OH APPEAL 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . 
ARGUMENT .. . . . . . 
I. 
II. 
III. 
INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS ARE DISFAVORED 
GENERALLY AND SUBJECT TO STRICT CONSTRUC-
TION AGAINST THE NEGLIGENT INDEMNITEE 
THE STATUTORY COMPENSATION PROVIDED BY THE 
UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IS THE 
ONLY EXPOSURE OF A COVERED EMPLOYER TO 
LIABILITY FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S INJURY 
THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF THE UTAH COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT IS TO APPORTION LIABILITY 
FOR DAMAGES PROPORTIONATELY TO THE NEGLIGENCE 
OF EACH PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases: 
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 
Page 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
6 
12 
13 
A-1 
207 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969). . 7 
Darin & Armstrong, Inc. v. Ben Agree Company, · 
276 N.W. 2d 869 (Mich. App. 1979) ...... . 
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Rota-Cone Field Operating 
Company, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (1972) .... 
-1-
11 
9 t lQ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued 
Hertz Equipment Rental Corporation v. Dravo 
Corporation, 360 So. 2d 325 (Ala. 1978) . . 
Howe Rents Corporation v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 
263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966) .•... 
Jankele v. Texas Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 
425 (1936) ..............•.. 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
Luken v. Westerman, D. Mass., C.A. 70-511-M 
(February 23, 1972) (unpublished opinion} . . . . . 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & 
Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 
(1948) ................ . 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah 430, 
274 P. 940 (1929) .....•..•.... 
Paul Krebs & Associates v. Matthews & Fritts 
Construction Company, 356 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 
1978) ............ . . . . . . . . . . . 
PhilliEs v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
614 p .2d 153 (Utah 1980) 
. . . . . • . . 
Roy v. Star Chopper Co . , Inc., 442 F.Supp. 1010 
(D. R.I. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . 
Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc. v. Mcintyre 
Electric Service, Inc., 401 So. 2d 745 
(Ala. 1981) . . . • . . . . . . • . . 
Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 
(10th Cir. 1966) . . . • . . • • . . • . . . 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 p. 2d 
910 (1965) . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Intermountain 
Farmers Association, 568 P.2d 724 (1977) .. 
Statutes: 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
Page 
10 
3 
2 
11 
7 
6 
10 
8 
11 
11 
7 
3 
5 
Utah Code Annotated § 13-8-1 (1953, as amended). . . . 3 
-ii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued 
Page 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 35-1-1 through 35-1-106 
{1953, as amended} ............ . . . . . 2 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-60 (1953, as amended). 6, 12, 13 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 
(1953, as amended) ............. . . . . 12 
Other Authorities: 
Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Law § 76.10 . . . . . . 9 
-iii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------------------------------------
SHELL OIL COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BRINKERHOFF-SIGNAL DRILLING 
COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18084 
-------------------------~----------------------------------
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an indemnification action brought by Appellant, 
Shell Oil Company, as a third-party action against Respondent, 
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Company, for all damages which are 
awarded to Respondent's employee, Billie Thomas Back, in his 
personal injury claim against Appellant. 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court granted Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's Third-Party 
Complaint. 
III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
-1-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the following additions, Respondent accepts Appel-
lent's Statement of Facts: 
1. Plaintiff Back's Comp·laint against Appellant alleges 
a cause of action for negligence based on Appellant's agent's 
conduct at the accident site (R. 1-2) . 
2. Respondent has in every way complied with all of its 
obligations as an employer under the Utah Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-1 through 35-1-106 (1953, as 
amended) , including securing compensation due Plaintiff Back 
for the alleged injury (R. 52). 
V . ARGUJ:.~ENT 
I. INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS ARE DISFAVORED GENERALLY AND 
SUBJECT TO STRICT CONSTRUCTION AGAINST THE NEGLIGENT 
INDEMNITEE. 
It has been long held by this Court that contracts 
exempting persons from liability for negligence are contrary 
to the public policy of inducing the exercise of due care. 
In Jankele v. Texas Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425, 427 
(1936), the Court stated: "It is very doubtful that defendant 
could relieve itself by contract from its own negligence. 
Ordinarily, such contracts are contrary to public policy." 
Thereafter, the Court reasoned that the highest incentive to 
the exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a fail-
ure to so act will fix liability for any resulting injury. 
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Although Utah law does not prohibit the enforcement of 
all indemnity agreements, case law has clearly demonstrated 
Utah's difference in policy concerns from those cited in Appel-
lant's Brief. In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 
(1965), this Court declared: 
[T]he law does not look with favor upon one exact-
ing a covenant to relieve himself of the basic 
duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of 
using due care for the safety of himself and 
others. This would tend to encourage careless-
ness and would not be salutary either for the 
person seeking to protect himself or for those 
whose safety may be hazzarded by his conduct. 
For these reasons, such covenants are sometimes 
declared invalid as being against public policy. 
The general distaste of the Utah courts for indemnity 
agreements is increased where an affirmative act of negligence 
is involved. Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 
207, 208 (1965). In Howe Rents Corporation v. Worthen, 18 
Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966), this Court set forth 
the standard rule of construction wherein the drafter of an 
indemnity provision which is to relieve him of liability for 
his own negligence, should have, in case of doubt, the provi-
sion strictly construed against him. 
This general judicial policy of disfavor toward indem-
nity agreements has been adopted by the Utah Legislature in 
Utah Code Annotated §13-8-1 (1953, as amended). Although not 
strictly applicable to the facts of this case, instructive is 
-3-
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the direction of the statute which prohibits a contractual pro-
vision as being against public policy and void when it purports 
to indemnify a promisee against liability for da.raages arising 
from the sole negligence of the promisee pursuant to a con-
struction contract. 
Paragraph 11.6 of the Master Rotary Drilling Contract 
is an attempt by Appellant to contract away liability for its 
own negligence in violation of the clear public policy of 
Utah. By way of this standard provision of its form contract, 
Appellant is attempting to evade responsibility for its own 
negligent conduct and that of its agents. This is exactly the 
elusive liability that the Court in Jankele feared. If Appel-
lant can rely upon Paragraph 11.6 for its complete indemnity 
for "all claims, demands, and causes of action" resulting from 
personal or property injury to Respondent's employees, there 
is no incentive for Appellant to exercise due care in its 
operations. 
In its Brief, Appellant relies heavily on cases from 
numerous other jurisdictions for the proposition that indemnity 
agreements "are valid and do not violate public policy." 
N~vertheless, although Respondent recognizes the impressive 
list of citations in Appellant's Appendix I, it does not agree 
with Appellant's conclusion. Rather, Respondent asserts that 
the Court need not go outside this jurisdiction to understand 
that Utah law will offer an indernnitee protection only in 
the rarest of circumstances. 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Assuming that in the absence of some considera-
tion of public policy militating against it, one 
may contract to protect himself against liability 
for loss caused by his negligence, it is never-
theless well settled that contracts in which a 
party attempts to do so are subject to strict 
construction against him; and further, that he 
will be afforded no protection unless the pre-
clusion is clearly and unequivocally stated. 
Walker Bank & Trust Company v. First Security Corporation, 
9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 947 (1959). The "majority rule" 
referred to by Appellant is discussed in Union Pacific Railroad 
Company v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 568 P.2d 724, 726 
(1977) , was that there is a presumption against any intention 
of the parties to form an agreement whereby a negligent party 
would be indemnified from its own negligent acts. Said pre-
sumption could be overcome only by a clear and unequivocal 
indemnity obligation intended by the parties to cover the speci-
fie set of circumstances. 
Appellant's overstated argument is best illustrated by 
its own attempt to parallel the subject indemnity provision 
with a conunercial liability insurance policy. An insurance 
policy is drafted and sold by a company trained and licensed 
specifically to offer such services. Such companies are regula-
ted in Utah by the State Insurance Department to assure fair 
practices and are the subjects of extensive legislation. On the 
other hand, Respondent is a drilling company. The indemnity 
provision at issue is but one subparagraph of a 28-page form 
contract, the main purpose of which is to provide an arrangement 
-5-
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for the drilling of oil ·wells. The narrow decision of refusing 
to enforce the subject provision in these circumstances need 
not be the harbinger of doom for the insurance industry, 
rather another example of public policy encouraging due care 
and safety in haza~dous operations. 
II. THE STATUTORY COMPENSATION PROVIDED BY THE UTAH WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION ACT IS THE ONLY EXPOSURE OF A COVERED 
EMPLOYER TO LIABILITY FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S INJURY. 
Section 35-1-60 of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
gives an injured employee the right to recover compensation 
pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act from the employer. 
It further provides that such compensation, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer 
... and the liabilities of the employer imposed 
by this act shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at conunon law or other-
wise, to such employee or ... any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury 
. . . incurred by such employee in the course of 
... his employment, and no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer . . . based upon 
any accident, injury, or death of an employee. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Utah State Supreme Court has early addressed the 
exclusiveness of the statutory remedy. "Since the enactment 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy 
of an employee who is injured in the course of his employment 
is the right to recover the compensation provided for in the 
Act .... " Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah 430, 
435, 274 P. 940, 942 (1929). This Court declared that the 
Act abrogates "the employee's common law right to sue the 
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employer for any and all injuries suffered while in the course 
of his employment, except in those cases where the employer 
was not subject to the act or the common law remedy of an em-
ployee was expressly reserved by the act." Masich v. United 
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191 
p. 2d 612' 616 (1948) . 
In its Brief, Appellant cites the Tenth Circuit case 
of Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 
1966) for the proposition that the "exclusive remedy" provision 
of the Utah Act is in fact non-exclusive as to contractual 
indemnity to third parties. Since the facts set forth in 
Titan appear analogous to those of the present case, the reason-
ing of the Tenth Circuit merits analysis. Nevertheless, Utah 
State courts do not accept rulings of Federal Courts as binding 
authority for the law of this State. Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 
2d 418 I 454 p .2d, 624 f 625 (1969) • 
In Titan, the Court reviewed an action on an indemnity 
agreement between an indemnitor-employer covered by the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act and a negligent indernnitee-third party 
as it related to injuries suffered by an employee, and noted 
that such "release-from-negligence contracts" are seen by federal 
law as contrary to public policy. The sparse Utah law upon 
which the Court could rely concerned only the issue of the 
validity of indemnity agreements generally. The conflict be-
tween indemnity agreements and the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act had not, nor has it to 
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date, been presented to the Utah State Supreme Court. Neither 
was the Tenth Circuit presented with any case from another 
jurisdiction construing the exclusionary language in a Work-
men's Compensation statute as forbidding enforcement of an 
indemnity contract where a negligent third party would be 
indemnified by the employer from all liability arising out of 
the injury of a covered employee. Therefore, absent support 
to the contrary, it upheld the agreement. 
Since that time, this Court has unambiguously extended 
the Act's exclusive remedy provisons to preclude third-party 
actions against an employer. 
The exclusive remedy provisions of both the Utah 
and North Carolina Workmen's Compensation provi-
sions make it clear that an employer's only lia-
bility for injuries sustained by an employee is 
the extent of benefits under the Act. Additional 
exposure through the indirect method of third-
party action would be a blatant violation of 
expressed legislative policy. 
Phillips v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 614 P.2d 153, 154 
(Utah I 19 8 0 ) • (Emphasis added) 
Appellant has listed numerous cases in its Appendix II 
which allegedly "hold that the exclusive remedy provisions of 
the applicable state and federal Workmen's Compensation statutes 
do not bar suits founded upon express contracts of indemnifica-
nification." However, a review of the respective statutes and 
factual circumstances surrounding the cited authorities offer 
insight into the reasoning of those other jurisdictions. Appen-
dix A to Respondent's Brief annotates the cases cited by Appellant, 
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very few of which actually uphold an express indemnity agree-
ment. And, those that do, concern distinguishing contractual 
provisions and/or are governed by a statute which differs 
materially from Utah's. 
Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in 
all of compensation law is the question of whether 
a third party in an action by the employee can 
get contribution or indemnity from the employer, 
when the employer's negligence caused or contri-
buted to the injury. 
Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Law, §76.10 at 14-287. 
Several jurisdictions have recently decided that the 
Legislature alone should make the exceptions to the exclu-
sivity provisions of their Workmen's Compensation Acts. In-
deed, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota have recently amended 
their statutes to expressly allow third-party indemnity agree-
ments to be enforced against an otherwise inunune employer .. 
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Rota-Cone Field Operating 
Company, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (1978), New Mexico's Workmen's 
Compensation Act was tested by an attempt to enforce a third-
party indemnity agreement on facts indistinguishable from the 
present case. 
This case presents a question of first impression 
in New Mexico. Is an employer subject to liability 
in addition to the Workmen's Compensation Act where 
the employer voluntarily enters into a contract 
which also seeks indemnity? We say "no." 
505 P.2d at 79. Voiding only the provisions of the contract 
which relate to indemnification, the court declared the statute 
-9-
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to be a prohibition of any additional liability sought to be 
imposed on a covered employer. 
Alabama has encountered several cases much like this 
one. In Paul Krebs & Associates v. Matthews & Fritts Construc-
tion Company, 356 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1978), the court was faced 
with an indemnity clause similar to that in the Master Rotary 
Drilling Contract. There, as here, an employee of the indernni-
tor was injured on the job partially due to the negligence of 
the indemnitee. The employee was precluded from suing his em-
ployer because of the exclusivity clause of the state's Work-
men's Compensation statute (similar to Utah's). When the 
employee sued the indemnitee, a third-party action was brought 
against the employer. The Alabama State Supreme Court refused 
to enforce the indemnity provision and upheld the dismissal 
of the third-party action stating: "To allow a third-party 
tort-feasor to recover over against the employer for injury to 
an employee would be to allow indirectly what is prohibited 
directly." Id. at 639. Overruling a prior inconsistent 
decision and citing Gulf Oil Corporation v. Rota-Cone Field 
Operating Company, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (1972), the 
Alabama court held that its Workmen's Compensation Act compelled 
the result since enforcement of the agreement would "write into 
the legislation an exception which is not there." Id. at 640. 
In Hertz Equipmental Rental Corporation v. Dravo Corpor-
ation, 360 So. 2d 325 (Ala. 1978), the Alabama court again 
reached the same legal conclusion, citing Paul Krebs as 
-10-
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dispositive of the issue. "The right to indemnity from Dravo 
is founded on a contractual duty which is unenforceable as vio-
lation of a legislative enactment. Most recently, that court 
echoed the same policies in Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc. v. 
Mcintyre Electric Service, Inc., 401 So. 2d 745 (Ala. 1981). 
Michigan and Massachusetts have also recently joined 
the growing number of jurisdictions which refuse to enforce 
indemnity agreements in contravention of State Workmen's Com-
pensation statutes. In Darin & Armstrong, Inc. v. Ben Agree 
Company, 276 N.W. 2d 869 (Mich. App. 1979), the court refused 
to enforce the indemnity provision as void as against public 
policy. "Nor could the provision be used to indemnify 
Darin & Armstrong from its concurrent negligence; this would 
be akin to contribution, which is forbidden by Michigan courts 
where worker's compensation is involved." Id. at 873. In 
Luken v. Westermann, C.A. 70-511-M (Februar.y 23, 1972) (un-
published opinion by the United States District Court in 
Massachusetts) , Judge Murray refused enforcement of contractual 
indemnity as violative of the Work~en's Compensation Act of 
Massachusetts. See, Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 442 F.Supp. 
(D.R.I. 1977). 
The legal positions taken by these courts are not with-
out theoretical opposition from other jurisdictions; however, 
in light of the strong legislative and judicial statements 
of policy in Utah, this State has demonstrated its intent to 
align itself with those jurisdictions upholding clear public 
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policy over an oppressive indemnity agreement. 
Respondent has complied with the Utah Act and, as an 
employer, has compensated Plaintiff Back for his alleged 
injuries. The third-party action brought by Appellant for 
for indemnification from Back's suit now threatens to violate 
both the language and the purpose of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. Additional liability is sought to be attached to 
Respondent indirectly through the third-party action, yet 
that liability is undeniably resultant from the accident. 
This is a direct violation of the mandate of Section 35-1-60 
and is incompatible with the clear interdiction of legisla-
tive policy encompassed in the Act. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF THE UTAH COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE ACT IS TO APPORTION LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGES PROPORTIONATELY TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
EACH PARTY. 
Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) are the legislative adoption of 
comparative negligence in Utah. The basic scheme of compensa-
tion diminishes total damages in a negligence action in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering. Joint tort-feasors then assume responsibility 
for damages due in proportion to their "relative degrees of 
fault'' causing the injury. Thus, the clear legislative policy 
of Utah is that the parties should be responsible for their 
proportion of the negligent cause of injury. 
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Paragraph 11.6 of the Master Rotary Drilling Contract 
is plainly in contravention of the unequivocable policy in 
the Utah Comparative Negligence Act. Through this indemnity 
agreement, Appellant seeks to shift all responsibility for 
the alleged injury to Plaintiff Back to Respondent. The un-
fairness and obvious violation of Utah pbulic policy is illus-
trated if Appellant were 99 percent at fault and Respondent 
only 1 percent responsible. Disregarding the legislative 
policy, Appellant's contractual provision would make Respon-
dent liable for 100 percent of the proven damages. 
By statute, Respondent cannot be a joint tort-feasor. 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-60 (1953, as amended). If Appellant 
was negligent and its negligence constituted at least 51 per-
cent of the total negligence as compared to Plaintiff Back, 
Appellant must be held 100 percent responsible for the alleged 
injuries caused by that negligence. Respondent is statutorily 
protected from all liability resulting from the accident having 
fulfilled its obligations providing Back compensation under the 
Workmen's Compensation statute. This is entirely consistent 
with the comparative negligence policy of making parties re-
sponsible for their own actions. Appellant must now fulfill its 
legal obligation and pay in full any proven damages caused by 
its negligence as a sole tort-feasor. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The action of the lower court in granting Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be sustained. Based on 
-13-
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the foregoing a~alysis, this Court should fill the void in 
the State's case law concerning indemnity agreements in Work-
men's Compensation actions by affirming the lower court's deci-
sion to hold the subject provision void and unenforceable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (' day of February, 1982. 
~ton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
Alaska 
Statute: Alaska Stat. §23-20-055; very broad and similar 
to Utah's; workmen's comp. remedy is exclusive 
against anyone entitled to damages from employee's 
injury. 
Case: Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, 
Hawaii 
343 F.Supp. 826 (D. Alas. 1972); Fed. court finds 
no state law on subject; relies on federal 
statutes to enforce indemnity agreement. 
Statute: Hawaii Rev. Stat. §386.5; indistinguishable 
from Alaska. 
Case: Kamali v. Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., 504 P.2d 
861 (Hawaii 1972) ; court finds contract not 
express enough for enforcement; dicta says en-
forcement possible if intent is clear enough. 
Maryland 
Statute: Md. Ann Code, Art. 101, §§15, 58; workmen's 
comp. remedy exclusive only to employee; 
limits employee's rights, not employer's 
liability. 
Case: Mason v~ Callas Contractors, Inc., 494 F.Supp. 
782 (D. Md. 1980); Fed. court upholds indemnity 
agreement; supports Appellant's argument. 
Massachusetts (cited as Rhode Island) 
Statute: Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 152, §§15, 24; broad 
replacement of civil actions by workmen's comp.; 
no "exclusive" language. 
Case: Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 442 F.Supp. 1010 
(R.I. 1977); Fed. court in Rhode Island inter-
preting Mass. law, rejects Mass. contrary deci-
sion and enforces indemnity agreement, see Brief 
at 11. 
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Michigan 
Statute: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §418.131; workmen's comp. 
remedy exclusive against employee; limits em-
ployee's rights, not employer's liability. 
Cases: Nanasi v. General Motors Corp., 56 Mich. App. 
Minnesota 
652, 224 N.W.2d 914 (1974); McLouth Steel Corp. 
v. A. E. Adnerson Const. Corp., 48 Mich. App. 
424, 210 N.W.2d 448 (1973); both cases enforcing 
indemnity agreement superceded by Darin & Armstrong, 
Inc. v. Ben Agree Company, 276 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. 
App. 1979), see Brief at 11. 
Statute: Minn. Stat. Ann. §176.061(10); expressly allows 
written indemnity contracts. 
Case: Irrelevant because of statute. 
Montana 
Statute: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§92-203 and 204; broad 
all encompassing "exclusive" remedy language. 
Case: DeSlaw v. Johnson, 472 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1970); 
court upholds contract which indemnifies only 
employer's negligence. 
Ohio 
Statute: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4123.74; broad language 
similar to Utah restricts employer's liability. 
Case: Williams v. Ashland Chemical Co., 52 Ohio App. 
2d 81, 368 N.W.2d 304 (1976); Dicta states that 
enforcement of indemnity contract is possible. 
Okalhoma 
Statute: Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 85, §12; very broad lan-
guage similar to Utah. 
Case: Harter Concrete Products, Inc. v. Harris, 592 
P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979); Dicta states that indem-
nity based on independent legal relationship may 
be enforced. 
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Oregon 
Statute: Or. Rev. Stat. §656.018(1); broad language simi-
lar to Utah. 
Cases: 
Pennsylvania 
Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co., 
539 P.2d 1059 (ore. 1975); United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 
Inc., 539 P.2d 1065 (Ore. 1975); both cases de-
clare indemnity agreements enforceable in work-
men's comp. cases, Kaiser in dicta. 
Statute: 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §48l(b); expressly allows 
written indemnity contracts. 
Case: Irrelevant because of statute. 
Texas 
Statute: Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 8306, §3; expressly 
alows written indemnity contracts. 
Cases: Irrelevant becuase of statute. 
Vermont 
Statute: Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 21, §622; limits employee's 
rights, not employer's liability. 
Case: New England T&T Company v. Central Vermont Public 
Service Corp., 391 F.Supp. 420 (D. Vt. 1975); 
Virginia 
Fed. court admits no state law on subject; follows 
other Fed. courts' decisions enforcing agreements. 
Statute: Va. Code §65.1-40; limits employee's rights, not 
employer's liability. 
Case: Burnette v. General Electric Co., 389 F.Supp. 
1317 (W.D. Va. 1975); Fed. court finds no state 
Washington 
law on subject; follows other Fed. courts enforcing 
agreements. 
Statute: Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. §§51.04.010 and 51.32.010; 
limits employee's rights, not employer's liability. 
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Cases: 
Wisconsin 
Redford v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 198, 615 
P.2d 1285 (1980); Calkins v. Lorain Division of 
Koehring Co., 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143 
(1980); Broxson v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul 
& Pacific R. Co., 446 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1971); 
Redford and Broxson uphold agreements indemnifying 
only employer's negligence; Calkins took great 
pains to avoid enforcing agreement while declaring 
indemnity possible. 
Statute: Wisc. Stat. §102.03(2); vague declaration of 
"exclusive remedy against employer." 
Cases: Hintz v. Darling Freight, Inc., 17 Wis.2d 376, 
117 N.W.2d 271 (1962).; Huck v. Chicago, St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 124, 92 
N.W.2d 349 (1958); Hintz allowed agreement indem-
nifying only employer's negligence; Huck did not 
discuss workmen's comp. 
Wyoming 
Statute: Wyo. Stat. §27-50; limits employee's rights, not 
employer's liability. 
Cases: Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Surety 
Conpany of New York, 365 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 
1966); Pan American Petroleum v. Maddux Well 
Service, 586 P.2d 1220 (Wyo. 1979); Pitts Fed. 
court finds no state law and enforces agreement 
indemnifying aonly employer's negligence; Maddux 
avoided enforcing that agreement, but declared 
inde~nity possible. 
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I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
Brief to be mailed to Chris Wangsgard and Jeffrey C. Collins 
of Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main, Suite 
1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, this /& day of February, 
1982. 
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